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NOTES
FEDERAL AND STATE ECONOMIC REGULATION-
A PREEMPTION PROBLEM
In Florida ie & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul' the United States Supreme
Court, by a five-to-four decision, upheld a California statute2 which required that
all avocados sold or transported in California must contain eight per cent oil by
weight. The effect of this statute was -to exclude from California many Florida-
grown avocados, although they were mature under the standards promulgated
by the Agricultural Adjustment Act.8 Florida avocado growers sought to enjoin
enforcement of the California statute on a number of grounds. First, they con-
tended that the Agricultural Adjustment Act should preclude application of the
California statute under the supremacy clause, and second, they believed that
the California statute, as applied, denied them equal protection. Finally, they
urged that the imposition of the California statute either unreasonably burdened
or discriminated against interstate marketing of avocados, in violation of the com-
merce clause. A majority of the Court rejected the first two contentions, but,
because of a question as to whether certain evidence was admitted, they remanded
the unreasonable-burden question for a new tnal.4
When the Court studied the supremacy contention, it applied what have come
to be the standard tests for preemption.5 The first inquiry was to see if there was
a "direct irreconcilable conflict"6 between the two statutes; next the Court ex-
amined the subject of avocado maturity regulations to see if it demanded
"national uniformity."7 The final test applied was to determine whether or not
Congress included in the Agricultural Adjustment Act a "clear and manifest de-
sign"8 to preclude state maturity regulations. The majority, relying on Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,9 held that there was no conflict because it was not
physically impossible for the Florida avocado to comply with both the federal
and the state maturity regulations. In deciding that there was no clear and mani-
fest intent on the part of Congress to "oust" all state maturity regulations, the
Court relied on its decision in Campbell v. Hussey.1o That case involved the
Federal Tobacco Inspection Act,11 and the legislative history of that statute em-
1373 U.S. 132 (1963).
2 CAL. Acm. CODE § 792.
848 Stat. 31 (1933), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-59 (1964).
4 373 U.S. at 154. Although the district court held that the Califorma oil test did
not violate the commerce clause, the Supreme Court did not review the question
because it could not ascertain the record upon which the lower court's decision was
based.
5 Abraham & Loder, The Supreme Court and the Preemption Question, 53 Ky. L.J.
289 (1965).6 Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
7Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
8B ice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
9 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
10 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
-149 Stat. 731 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§501-17 (1964), 511(a):
"[Without uniform standards of classification and inspection the evaluation of tobacco
is susceptible to speculation, mapulation and control."
[619]
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phasizes the necessity for uniform inspection practices to protect the producers
and public.' 2 The majority in the Avocado case stated that these purposes were
absent from the legislative history of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Therefore,
the Court held that Congress exhibited no intention that state avocado maturity
regulations should yield to the federal act. And, finally, a necessity for national
uniformity in avocado maturity regulations did not exist, reasoned the Court, be-
cause avocado maturity standards were not "vital to national interests,"'3 but
were traditionally left to state control
The dissenting justices, confining their opinon solely to the supremacy prob-
lem, applied the same tests for preemption as the majority, but reached diametri-
cally opposite conclusions. For example, where the majority saw no conflict, the
dissent argued that there was a definite conflict between the two statutes, evi-
denced by the fact that six per cent of the "federally mature" Florida avocados
were excluded from California markets.14
An attempt at a reconciliation of the two opimons would be a strenuous task.
However, by a thorough examination of one aspect of the dissent, one might
perceive not only a different view of the Avocado case, but also a clearer under-
standing of the complex problem of preemption in interstate commerce. The dis-
sent stated that the problem was a purely economic one, economic in the sense
that the marketing of immature avocados resulted in consumer dissatisfaction, a
diminution of demand for the fruit, and ultimately in a small return to the
farmer.15
The purposes of this note are to illustrate the economic objectives of both the
federal and state maturity regulations, and further, to examine whether or not it
is a valid application of the preemption doctrine to require state legislation con-
cermng maturity standards, having an economic effect, to yield to federal
regulations.
A perusal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act itself reveals that its objectives
were primarily of an economic nature: the declaration of policy states that the
statute was enacted "to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions
for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce as will establish, as the prices
to farmers, parity prices "' A reading of the Federal Register indicates the
governmental concern with the conditions in the avocado industry.17 It reports
the very detailed and inclusive marketing agreements that were proposed. Many
cases also assert that the Act manifested a purpose to improve the economic
situation of the industry.' 8 The Califorma supreme court stated in United States
v. Superior Court:19
12 Florida Lune & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963).
'ld, at 144.
14373 U.S. 132, 166 (1963).
15 Id. at 169.
16 62 Stat. 1257 (1948), 7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (1965).
17 19 Fed. Reg. 2418-430, 2424(4) (e) (1954). "As has been indicated heretofore,
the Florida avocado growers are now receiving relatively low returns for their crops.
Probably the most important single factor is that of maturity. An immature avocado is
unpalatable, and increases consumer resistance and materially affects the marketing
of the entire crop."
Is E.g., Panno v. United States, 203 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op, 26 F Supp. 534 (N.D.N.Y. 1939).
19 19 Cal. 2d 189, 191, 120 P.2d 26, 27 (1941).
[Vol. 17
March, 1966] NOTES 621
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 in establishing a plan for
regulating the interstate marketing of agricultural products, is designed to raise
farm prices and thus restore to the farmer a lost purchasing power, to prevent
waste from overproduction and to eliminate the evils of unfair competition.
From an examination of the policy stated in the legislative and case reports, it
would seem clear that the nature and purpose of the federal legislation was
economic.
The federal regulations or "marketing agreements" that controlled the market-
ing of avocados were promulgated by the Florida growers in cooperation with
the Secretary of Agriculture.20 Since these agreements were adopted by the
growers as self-help measures to increase their income and protect themselves,
it is improbable that the Florida growers would have omitted any important seg-
ment of the growing or marketing from control.2 ' In Parker v. Brown,2 2 upon
which the majority m the Avocado case relied, the Supreme Court held the Cali-
forma Agricultural Prorate Act23 not to be preempted by the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act. Pursuant to the state statute, many farmers adopted an extensive
marketing program for raisms. Contemporaneously, there were no federal market-
ng orders concerning raisms then in effect. Since there were no federal regulations
that could supersede the state program, the Supreme Court upheld the California
act, stating that it should remain in effect at least until the Secretary of Agri-
culture adopted a raism marketing plan. Clearly these two cases are distinguish-
able. In Parker no federal marketing agreements were in effect, but in the Avocado
case the Secretary of Agriculture had adopted a pervasive regulatory scheme
encompassing the marketing and maturity standards of avocados.
Many of the unfavorable economic conditions that prompted adoption of the
federal marketing regulations by the Florida growers also existed in the California
avocado industry. While discussing the California act, the district court stated that
the marketing of immature avocados increases sales resistance, lowers prices, and
diminishes the return to the grower.2 4 To eliminate this cause of diminished
return to the California growers, it was deemed necessary to enact certain legis-
lation on maturity standards. The California growers, unlike the Florida growers
and the Secretary of Agriculture, believed the oil test to be the most accurate
gauge of maturity. From this brief statement of the conditions in the California
industry and consequent legislative remedy, it may be concluded that the adop-
tion of this section of the Agricultural Code,2 5 like the adoption of the federal
act, was to fulfill an economic purpose.
After it is concluded that the California statute is economic legislation, a
20 48 Stat. 34 (1933), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1964); 49 Stat. 757 (1935), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8) (1964). The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered
by the Act to issue a wide variety of orders covering agricultural produce. However,
many of these orders are not put into effect until a majority of the handlers of the
produce sign a "marketing agreement."
21See 19 Fed. Reg. 2418-430 (1954) which gives a detailed example of the
agreement concerning the Florida avocados.
22317 U.S. 341 (1943).
23 Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 754, at 1969. For the present codification of the original
Prorate Act see CAL. Acir. CoDE §§ 2000-2401.24 Forida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 197 F Supp. 780, 782-83 (N.D.
Cal. 1961).
25 CAL. Acnr. CoDE § 792.
question may arise concerning the real motive for adopting the eight-per-cent-oil
test. There was definitely fierce competition between the Califorma and Florida
avocado industries at the time the California statute was enacted, 26 and perhaps
the ain of the California act was to exclude much of the produce of competitors.
Any discussion about the intent of the California legislature would be mere con-
jecture, though, because the legislative history of the statute gives no indication
of its purpose.27 Nevertheless, one must be cognizant of the far-reaching effect
of this economic statute enacted under the state police power. By its own terms,
the statute forbids the marketing or transporting in California of any avocado,
unless it contains eight per cent oil by weight.
The conclusion that this legislation is pervasive and economic is helpful if
an affimative answer can be given to this question: does federal economic legis-
lation concermng specific subject matter preclude state regulation concerning the
same subject? Apparently the Supreme Court has never held that a state statute
was preempted solely on the grounds of an economic conflict between state and
federal legislation. Thus there is a requirement of careful analysis of cases where
the Court has held state legislation of an economic nature to be preempted.
In cases that involve conflicting state and federal economic legislation, the Court
often encounters the problem of whether to base its decision on undue burden or
preemption grounds. Where state legislation was enacted for the obvious purpose
of favoring local industry or discriminating against interstate commerce, the Court
will readily void the state statute as an undue burden under the commerce
clause.28 Frequently, though, a state will enact legislation for the ostensible pur-
pose of protecting health or conserving resources, but the ultimate effect (or
perhaps the primary objective) of the legislation is to promote or protect local
mdustry.29 In the cases involving the latter fact situation, the Court has either
struck down the state statute as an undue burden or held it void under the
supremacy clause8o
Discussed below are three cases, representing the apparent modem trend,
where state economic legislation was held precluded because of its repugnancy
to federal laws under the supremacy clause, and not because the legislation was
an undue burden on interstate commerce. For example, in the recent case of
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Comm'n,31 the Kansas State Corporation
Commission ordered a natural gas company, engaged in interstate commerce, to
26 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 153 n.19 (1963).
27 49 CA ND.n oF LxcisLA'nv Busn-mss 174, Bill 446 (1931).
28 Dean Milk. Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). In the Dean Milk Co. case a city ordinance made it un-
lawful to sell, as pasteurized, any milk in the city unless it was bottled within five miles
of Madison. The Supreme Court stated: "In thus erecting an economic bamer protecting
a major local industry against competition from without the state, Madison plainly dis-
crimiates against interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even in the exercise of its
unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people " 340 U.S. at
354. 29 Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. BEv. 208, 220 (1959).
SO Compare Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), with City of Chicago v.
Atchison, T. & S.F Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
Si 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
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purchase gas in equal amounts from all the Kansas wells to which it was con-
nected. After an extensive analysis of the purpose and effect of these orders, the
Supreme Court held that they were not conservation measures. Moreover, the
Court found that these orders were an attempt to regulate the purchase of natural
gas, and, as such, invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Com-
mission, and were also in opposition to the Natural Gas Act.8 2 On these grounds
the Court held the State Commission orders to be preempted.
A fact situation analogous to the Avocado case occurred in Public Util.
Comm'n v. United States.83 The federal statute,34 there permitted agencies of
the federal government to negotiate their own freight rates in order to procure
the least costly means of transportation. It would seem that legislation for the
express purpose of securing inexpensive transportation for the Government is of
an economic nature. In opposition to these regulations, a section of the California
Public Utilities Code3 5 granted the state commission power to determine rates
that common earners could charge the agencies of the United States. The Su-
preme Court held that the state statute could not be the determining factor as
to what rates were to be paid by the United States when there was a specific
federal statute covering the subject.3 6 The conflict, stated the Court in the Public
Util. Comm'n case, was of the precise type which the supremacy clause was de-
signed to resolve.3 7 Quaere: Is the latter fact situation distinguishable in type
from the Avocado case where the state statute determined which Florida avocados
could enter California?
One more case further exemplifies the proposition that state economic legis-
lation enacted under the police power is preempted when it conflicts with federal
economic legislation. The Supreme Court, in City of Chicago v. Atchison, T &
S.F Ry.,8S affirmed a lower court judgment which held a city ordinance3 9 re-
pugnant to both the Constitution and federal statutes. The case concerned an
interterminal shuttle service for interstate passengers. This service was necessary
because the tracks of many railroads terminate in different parts of Chicago. A
number of railroads decided to provide such a shuttle service themselves, and
32 52 Stat. 821 (1938); 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1964).
33355 U.S. 534 (1958); see generally The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 H1Mv. L.
REv. 77, 161 (1958).
34
'Purchases of and contracts for property and services covered by this chapter
shall be made by formal advertising. However, the head of an agency may negotiate such
a purchase or contract " 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1964).
3 5 CAL. PUB. Urm. CoDE § 530, which states: "The commission may permit common
carriers to transport property at reduced rates for the United States, state, county, or
municipal governments, to such extent and subject to such conditions as it may con-
sider just and reasonable."36 Accord, United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963); But
see Penn Dames, Inc. v. Milk Control Conmn, 318 U.S. 261 (1943). In the latter
case a milk dealer sold dairy products to the Army at prices lower than required by
state law. After his application to renew his milk license was turned down, the
dealer sought to have the Pennsylvania Milk Control Law invalidated. It was held
that the state law was not preempted.
87355 U.S. 534, 544 (1958).
38357 U.S. 77 (1958).
89 CmcAGo, ILL., MuNicni.L CoDE § 28-31.1. (1955).
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ended their existing contracts with an independent transfer company. At this
time the city had in effect a detailed plan to regulate and license public passenger
vehicles for hire. However, after the termination of the contract, the ordinance
was amended to provide that no license would be granted unless the City Com-
missioner first deemed that public convemence and necessity required additional
service. The amendment seemed to be a justifiable regulation to prevent over-
crowding streets and to promote the public welfare; yet, in actuality, it gave the
City Commission the power to forbid an interstate earner from providing service
regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act.40 Although the Court might have
rested its decision to invalidate the ordinance on the undue burden ground, it
stated, "In our judgment the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act pre-
chide the city from exercising any veto power over such transfer service "41
In the three cases discussed immediately above, federal economic legislation
was held to preempt state economic legislation over the same subject matter. The
primary concern here is to determine whether or not the doctrine of these cases
could be validly applied to the Avocado case. In making tlus determination, a brief
comparison of pertinent legislation and the particular conflicts involved, in both
the Avocado and the above-discussed cases, is helpful.
It has already been indicated that both the relevant sections of the California
Agricultural Code, and the (federal) Agricultural Adjustment Act, were economic
statutes. The primary purpose of the (federal) Natural Gas Act was to protect the
consumer against unjust rates, but it also included sections on rate fixing, depre-
ciation rates, and costs of natural gas property.42 The Interstate Commerce Act
also contains a number of economic provisions, concerning rate control, rebates
and consolidations.43
For a complete and effective comparison between the Avocado case and the
discussed cases one must find similarity not only among the federal statutes, but
also among the state statutes. The orders of the Kansas Commission and the
Califorma Agricultural Code display many similarities. The orders were issued
as conservation measures while the California maturity regulations were adopted
to prevent deception. Thus, both were adopted ostensibly as public welfare mea-
sures, but the ultimate purpose of each was economic. The purpose of one was to
increase the income to the avocado grower, and the purpose of the other was to
regulate the purchase of natural gas. The section of the California Public Utilities
Code conferred on the Public Utilities Commission the power to determine just
and reasonable rates paid by the agencies of the federal government.
The final subjects of comparison are the actual conflicts that arose between
state and federal legislation in the discussed cases and in the Avocado case. The
dissent in the Avocado case correctly points out that there is a definite conflict
between the two statutes, based on the fact that approximately six per cent of the
Florida avocados are excluded from Califorma each year. But the more basic
conflict is that the Califorma legislation may, by imposing its own maturity
standards, exclude avocados from California which are mature by federal stand-
ards. A similar conflict existed in the Atchison case, where the city ordinance
permitted a local commission to determine whether or not an interstate earner,
40 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
41357 U.S. at 85.
42 52 Stat. 822-24 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d, 717e (1964).
4324 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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